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A B S T R A C T
Although much has been written about the ideology of Laurent Gbagbo’s Front
Populaire Ivoirien in Côte d’Ivoire and its impact on the Ivorian politico-
military crisis, little attention has been paid to the ubiquitous role of the law in
the discourse and political strategy of the pro-Gbagbo elite. The Ivorian case
may provide important insights about the connection between ultranationalist
ideology and a legalist, formalist conception of democracy and national
sovereignty. The article analyses the circumstances of the emergence of ‘legalist
nationalism’ in Côte d’Ivoire by looking at key episodes of the Ivorian transition
between  and . The article discusses the relevance of Pierre
Englebert’s concept of ‘legal command’ and the turbulences of democratic
transitions in accounting for the prominence of legalism in Ivorian politics. It
explores the implications of the Ivorian case for understanding the connection
between law and politics in Africa.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
On  December , Laurent Gbagbo, the outgoing president of Côte
d’Ivoire, took a new presidential oath at the Presidential Palace in
Abidjan. The ceremony was notable for the almost total absence of the
diplomatic corps. As a matter of fact, the ceremony was deemed a
provocation by most of the members of the so-called international
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community. For them, the outcome of the presidential elections was not
in question: the winner of the second round, held on  November, was
Gbagbo’s rival, former Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who
had obtained ·% of the votes, as announced by Youssouf Bakayoko,
the head of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The United
Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)
in Côte d’Ivoire, Young Jin Choi, had endorsed the IEC results as part of
his mandate of certiﬁcation of the elections. In the eyes of Gbagbo’s
supporters, however, the IEC announcement was ﬂawed and the only
valid results were those expressed by the Constitutional Council, which
had invalidated the election in seven Northern circumscriptions and
proclaimed Gbagbo the winner.
By staging his investiture, Gbagbo was thus openly challenging
international public opinion, as well as a part of national public opinion.
His stubborn and provocative stance was perhaps not unexpected from
a man who had begun his political career as a staunch opponent of
the then apparently untouchable regime of Félix Houphouët-Boigny.
Moreover, Gbagbo’s antagonistic stance towards the international
community, particularly France and the UN, had several precedents
since the conclusion of the  Linas-Marcoussis agreement (Piccolino
), which had brought a shaky end to violent conﬂict between his
regime and the insurgents Forces Nouvelles (FN). In public discourses,
the Gbagbo regime claimed to break away from the shackles of a ‘special
relationship’ with France and the Western block, which had been a
building block of previous regimes (Akindès ; Bouquet ;
McGovern ).
One could thus have expected Gbagbo to stress the problem of
national sovereignty in his speech at the oath ceremony, or to present
himself as a champion of anticolonialism and African dignity, as he had
done on other occasions. Instead, the self-styled president chose to open
his speech with another theme:
Today, I understand better why there are so many crises in Africa . . . What
I would like to stress today is that these crises come out also from the fact
that people are outside the law. People do not like to respect the law and the
procedures that stem from it. There is no strong State, no strong Republic
without laws and procedures . . . The only strong Republic is the one that
stands on legally established rules. Since I have become president, I have
realized that all the crises that we have known have come out from the non
respect of the law, of the jurisdiction and of the procedures [la loi, le droit et les
procédures] that this law produces. However, we cannot claim that we are
building democracy and put aside the law and the procedures stemming from
it. (Fraternité Matin .., italics added)
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The words ‘loi’ (‘law’), ‘droit’ (‘right’, but also synonymous of law in
French), and ‘procédures’ (procedures) recur in an almost obsessive
fashion in this speech, especially in connection with democracy. And, in
a subsequent speech where he expressed his views on the post-election
crisis, Gbagbo continued to insist that ‘all the troubles that we are
witnessing today in Côte d’Ivoire have come out from the refusal of my
rival to abide by the laws, the rules and the procedures applicable in our
country’ (Gbagbo ).
One may perhaps wonder why a man who had in the past challenged
the existing order as a political opponent should devote so much
space to the argument of the law and of the legal order. Researchers
have labelled the Gbagbo regime’s ideology as ‘ultranationalist’, ‘antic-
olonialist’, ‘nativist’, ‘ethnonationalist’, ‘populist’ (Banégas a;
Marshall-Fratani ; Arnaut ; Cutolo ), but despite an
abundant literature dedicated to Ivorian nationalism, the legalistic
dimension of this nationalism has received little attention. Moreover,
the problematic and ambiguous role of the law in Côte d’Ivoire’s recent
history has been downplayed by the international and human rights
organisations’ insistence over the necessity to restore the ‘rule of law’
(Hellweg ; Bovcon ). Francis Akindès, however, has neverthe-
less noticed that, during the political transition that followed the
 short-lived civil conﬂict, a legalistic interpretation of democracy
occupied a central place in the public discourse of Gbagbo’s party Front
Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) and of the former president’s supporters
(Akindès ).
In an earlier article (Piccolino ) in which I reconstructed the
origins and political function of Gbagbo’s nationalism, I brieﬂy pointed
to the surprising relevance of legalism in the discourse and practice of
Gbagbo and his supporters. This article builds on that earlier work to
discuss possible links between ultranationalism and a legalist, formalist
conception of democracy and national sovereignty. I look at the Ivorian
case, but I also try to draw some broader implications for Africa. While
my previous article provided a broad overview of the Gbagbo regime’s
ideology, the focus of this article is on a particular dimension of Ivorian
nationalism that has been little addressed by the political science
literature: the rhetoric and function of legalism in African politics.
My argument is that the concept of ‘legal command’ and its role in
African politics, as theorised in the work of Pierre Englebert, provide a
useful framework to understand the centrality of the law in the Gbagbo
regime’s political discourse. However, for understanding the emergence
of Gbagbo’s legalist ultranationalism one also has to integrate factors
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that are speciﬁcally Ivorian in the explanation. Moreover, the role of
legalism in African politics should also be understood in the context of
resistance of African political elites to democratisation.
The article is structured as following. I begin by discussing the nature
of the state and politics in Africa and the centrality of legal command in
African politics. In the second section, I reconnect the concept of legal
command with the Ivorian experience, discussing the factors that have
led to the emergence of ultranationalist legalism in Côte d’Ivoire. I look
in particular at Côte d’Ivoire’s turbulent transition to multi-party rule in
the s and at the outbreak of the  civil war. In the third section
I analyse the centrality of legal formalism in the discourse and political
strategy of the pro-Gbagbo camp since the conclusion of the Linas-
Marcoussis peace agreement to the – post-election crisis. In
the conclusion, I discuss the lessons offered by the Ivorian case for
understanding the relation between law and politics in Africa.
T H E A F R I C A N S T A T E : A J U R I D I C A L C R E A T U R E ?
The law and the supreme law – the Constitution – are the prime formal
institutions of a modern state. ‘Neo-patrimonial theory’ – the dominant,
although contested paradigm to the study of African politics – posits that
the African states are characterised by coexistence of formal institutions
and formal rules on the one hand, and informal behaviour on the
other. This interaction provides rent opportunities for political elites
and thus access to the state is highly sought and prized.
In practice, however, scholars of African politics have paid more
attention to informal institutions as such than to their interaction with
formal ones. Concepts such as ‘personal rule’ (Jackson & Rosberg
a), ‘Big Man rule’ (Posner & Young ), ‘economy of affection’
(Hyden ) or ‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ (Chabal & Daloz
) have dominated the debate over African politics. The view that
the State in Africa is a mere façade and that ‘legitimacy is ﬁrmly
embedded in the patrimonial practices of patrons’ (Chabal & Daloz,
: ) or in a ‘cultural matrix’ revolving around metaphors of family
and food (Schatzberg ) makes it difﬁcult to understand how the
law and the Constitution may occupy a central place in the discourse of
African political elites.
The neglect of the inﬂuence of the law also seems motivated by the
acknowledgement that, in Africa, it does not play the role of limitation of
the arbitrary character of power that is inscribed in Western conceptions
of democracy. The practitioners of international institutions and NGOs
 G I U L I A P I C C O L I N O
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routinely deplore the weak development of the rule of law in Africa and
in other parts of the developing world and develop projects aimed at
strengthening it. The UN, for example, have a dedicated inter-agency
working group on rule of law and most current and recent UN peace
operations in Africa have included a ‘rule of law’ section. On another
level, however, the acknowledgement that African reality is dominated
by informalisation prompts another question: why do formal and
legally deﬁned institutions, particularly the state, persist in spite of
their apparent inefﬁcacy?
More than  years ago, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (Jackson &
Rosberg b; Jackson ) tried to respond to this question by
drawing attention to the ‘juridical’ character of Africa’s states and of
their sovereignty. According to Jackson, most African states issued from
decolonisation were not endowed with full ‘empirical sovereignty’ at
independence, i.e. the capacity to hold the monopoly of force over
territory. Nevertheless, the international system had conferred to these
states a ‘juridical sovereignty’ that allowed them to persist in spite of
their evident shortcomings.
Jackson’s arguments have been considerably nuanced by other
scholars (Clapham ; Krasner ; Herbst ). Notably, Jeffrey
Herbst has argued that it is more appropriate to trace the origins of
‘juridical sovereignty’ to the colonial period. Christopher Clapham has
observed that Jackson paints a binary opposition between ‘empirical’
and ‘juridical’ states, while the matter is more one of ‘degrees of
statehood’. Stephen Krasner has noticed that absolute sovereignty has
always been to some extent ‘organised hypocrisy’ even in the Western
world. Moreover, with the redeﬁnition of state sovereignty that has
taken place after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the protection that the
international society grants to the ‘juridically sovereign’ states has ceased
to be absolute and unconditional as Jackson paints it. Jackson’s
observations, however, remain valuable in one respect: the ‘juridically
sovereign’ nature of the African states has important implications for the
way these states conduct their international relations and for their
internal mode of governance.
Pierre Englebert (Englebert ) is one of the rare authors who
has explored the internal implications of the juridical sovereign nature
of African states. Englebert remarks that the increasingly qualiﬁed
protection of international society does not explain the relative scarcity
of internal challenges to the formal existence of the state in Africa.
Englebert is particularly concerned by the fact that, even in situations
that could be qualiﬁed as state failure or de facto secession, political
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actors continue to deﬁne their actions with respect to the ‘failed’ or
divided state and the population expresses strong feelings of belonging
and identiﬁcation with the state.
According to Englebert, the legal nature of the African state and its
juridical sovereignty may help unfold the paradox of the vitality of the
state. For him, juridical sovereignty confers legal command to the
African states. This is deﬁned as ‘the capacity to control, dominate,
extract or dictate through the law’ (Englebert : ). Englebert
observes that even if the state is no longer capable of performing its
public functions it still retains this residual command, which stems from
the fact that the state is the law. He sees in the juridical nature of state
power, acquired from international sovereignty, a key for explaining a
puzzling phenomenon acknowledged by anthropologists such as Jean
and John Comaroff (Comaroff & Comaroff ): the relevance of a
‘fetishism of the law’ in the midst of political disorder in Africa and in
other countries of the ‘global South’.
Englebert’s concept of legal command ﬁnds an expression in many
instances, such as the production of ofﬁcial certiﬁcations and identity
documents, the printing of currency, and the right to seize public
resources. The deﬁnition of the access to citizenship is perhaps the more
powerful dimension of this authority, as citizenship grants access to the
other beneﬁts that legal command may provide.
‘Legal command’ is crucial to understanding the functioning of neo-
patrimonial systems. It offers opportunities for rent seeking not only to
the main power holders, but also to the many local authorities, state
agents and intermediary actors that are dominated and dominant at the
same time. The fact that these authorities embody the legitimacy of the
state, deﬁned in legal terms, becomes crucial to their capacity to extract
rents even in the absence of administrative effectiveness and coercive
capacities. The centrality of ‘legal command’ implies thus an essentially
instrumental view of the law, which becomes a tool to exercise power
over others, often in the pursuit of private gain, rather than an
instrument for limiting the state’s arbitrary power. The ‘rule of law’ is
overcome by the ‘rule by law’.
Englebert argues that there is a link between juridical sovereignty
and legal command on the one hand and the emergence in Africa of
a particular type of nationalism. This nationalism is deprived of the
liberating qualities attributed to the assertion of national identity by
much early literature on Africa’s nationalism (Young ). First, this
nationalism is diversionary and is agitated by the elites in power for
neutralising internal and international threats to their domination.
 G I U L I A P I C C O L I N O
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Its aim is to imprint the state’s external sovereignty into the hearts and
minds of African citizens, in order to make the juridical state appear
natural and divert the blame for development failure (Englebert :
–). Thus, elite-driven nationalism in Africa tends to be self-serving
and instrumental, rather than laying the ground for a political project of
emancipation and development.
Englebert observes, however, that nationalism is also produced at the
grassroots level. In fact, what gives to legal command its resilience and its
force is the fact that its beneﬁts are diffused within the society. However,
‘this type of nationalism arises from competitive contact with others
from the same country, it is solitary and mutually alienating, rather than
the expression of the bonds of the community’ (Englebert : ).
Although this article will focus mainly on the diversionary use of
nationalism at the elite level, the concept of ‘solitary nationalism’ seems
particularly appropriate to make sense of some troubling characters of
the Ivorian pro-Gbagbo movement of the ‘young patriots’ (Banégas
a; Arnaut ; Koné ; Cutolo & Banégas ). Research
carried out among the patriots has frequently highlighted the extreme
factionalism that characterised the movement (Koné ; Cutolo &
Banégas ), which is all the more impressive given the absence of
substantial ideological differences among groups and factions. These
factional struggles make sense only by looking at the competition among
patriotic organisations for the beneﬁts distributed by the Gbagbo regime
and for additional material and moral advantages that stem from being
perceived by the Ivorian public as the ‘true’ representatives of the
patriotic movement (Koné ). Thus, Ivorian patriots competed for
power and resources obtained through proximity with the state, the only
actor that could give them a clout of legitimacy through its monopoly of
legal command.
L E G A L C O M M A N D I N C Ô T E D ’ I V O I R E ’ S H I S T O R Y
Pierre Englebert’s theory provides a framework for understanding the
connection between legal command and ultra-nationalism. Arguably,
however, the importance of legal command in politics has not been
always constant in Africa and has not everywhere led to the emergence
of an ultranationalist ideology imbued with legalism such as in Côte
d’Ivoire under the Gbagbo presidency. How can we thus explain Côte
d’Ivoire’s speciﬁcity? To some extent, Englebert’s theory is able to
account for the emergence of legalism in Côte d’Ivoire and not
elsewhere. However, there are also additional elements that contribute
U L T R A N A T I O N A L I S M , D E M O C R A C Y A N D T H E L A W
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to an explanation of the Ivorian case, in particular the relation between
legalism and (ﬂawed) democratisation.
It can be argued, following Englebert’s framework, that the linkage
between nationalism and legalism is more likely to emerge when
nationalists have very little to cling to beyond ‘the juridical state’.
‘Illegitimate post-colonial statehood’ (Englebert : ) is an African
phenomenon, but not all African states suffer to the same extent from
such a ‘legitimacy deﬁcit’. Some African countries share a sense of
common cultural identity or a history of decolonisation struggle that
provide a more credible narrative to would-be nationalists. In spite of
Gbagbo and the young patriots’ efforts to wrap their political struggle
into a rhetoric of ‘second independence’ (Banégas a), Côte
d’Ivoire lacks both. During its ﬁrst decades of existence, the nation
very much identiﬁed with its leader Houphouët-Boigny, who shaped it in
his image. The experience of the Gagnoa revolt, which has often been
regarded as one of the founding moments of Gbagbo’s nationalism
(Marshall-Fratani ), was a localised and ethnically bounded one
that could not provide the basis for a nation-wide nationalist ideological
project.
To understand the rise of an ultranationalist legalist discourse in Côte
d’Ivoire one has also to consider the context of economic recession
and state decay that the country experienced since the end of the
Houphouët-Boigny’s regime. Englebert observes that a radicalisation of
nationalism, leading to the emergence of forms of ‘nativist nationalism’
(Bøås ; Dorman et al. ) is more likely to emerge in a situation
of shrinking state patronage, where some groups try to bar other groups
from access to citizenship and to the legal command that stems from
it. He also argues that the importance of ‘legal command’ is connected
to the crisis of the state in its capacity to control effectively the
national territory and implement its policies. The more a state is able to
exercise effective control, the less it is obliged to insist on its legality.
Ultranationalist legalism in Côte d’Ivoire has emerged in a context
where the Ivorian administrative apparatus, which was known for its
relative efﬁciency under Houphouët-Boigny, had experienced a decline
due to the detrimental identity politics of the s. In particular, the
loss of control of more than % of the ofﬁcial state territory following
the  rebellion has provided the main background for its
emergence.
The role of the Constitution and the law in Côte d’Ivoire should also
be interpreted within a longer historical context. When Côte d’Ivoire
adopted its ﬁrst Constitution as an independent state in  there was
 G I U L I A P I C C O L I N O
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already an understanding that the typical Western notion of a
Constitution as a tool for limiting the power of the ruler had little
relevance (Alexander ). The Constitution sanctioned the promi-
nence of the president and the executive and left little powers to the
legislative branch. Moreover, the Constitution was very little ‘popularly
owned’, both in the sense that its main source of inspiration was
exogenous and was provided by the French Constitutional tradition
and that it had been drafted with little popular involvement by a small
political élite composed by those who were called at the time évolués. The
provisions of the Constitution on free and fair election and the right to
form political parties remained de facto unapplied for most of the
Houphouët-Boigny era. Nevertheless, A.S. Alexander, an American
lawyer who worked as an assistant to the President of the Ivorian
Supreme Court in –, contends that Houphouët-Boigny took
the Constitution seriously, in so far as he recognised it as having an
important legitimising role, and saw it as an instrument to consolidate
his power. The Ivorian Constitution was not a brake on government
action but could work as an accelerator (Alexander ).
Although these remarks suggest that Houphouët-Boigny was already
aware of the importance of legal command, it shall also be remarked
that he never relied primarily or exclusively on the appeal of legalism for
legitimising his rule. His political ability in defusing any threat to his
rule, the economic successes of his regime and his capacity to readapt
Akan traditional notions of legitimate rule (Maddox Toungara )
were equally key. Moreover, Houphouët-Boigny’s system of personal
rule was very much condoned at the internal and international level, at a
time when authoritarianism and one party rule were seen as necessary
elements in a process of nation building. Thus, Houphouët-Boigny’s
legitimacy was not continuously questioned due to the democratic
deﬁcit of his regime, nor was he obliged to justify his actions with
reference to any notion of democracy.
For understanding how legalism has become a central factor in the
Ivorian political arena, it is necessary to go back to the crisis of
the Ivorian political system at the end of the s and the distortion of
the democratic game that characterised the Ivorian early experience
with multi-party politics. As other African countries (Bratton & Van de
Walle ), Côte d’Ivoire was invested in the early s by the wave of
post-cold war political liberalisation. However, the introduction of multi-
party politics and of some formal features of a democratic system has not
led to the establishment of a full and sustainable democracy. Façade
democratisation has not been accompanied by the development of a
U L T R A N A T I O N A L I S M , D E M O C R A C Y A N D T H E L A W
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culture of dialogue and by the acceptance of political competition
(Akindès ) but has resulted in the fragmentation of the Ivorian
political arena into mutually intolerant ‘blocks’.
The three leaders who have dominated the Ivorian political game
since the death of Houphouët-Boigny –Henri Konan Bédié, Laurent
Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara, plus the putschist general Robert Gueï,
killed in  – have been, to a different extent and in different
manners, responsible for this downward spiral (Dozon ; Vidal
; Bouquet ; Akindès ). Political dynamics have reinforced
the association of each of the three leaders with a broad ethno-regional
grouping: Bédié with the baoulé of central Côte d’Ivoire, Ouattara with
the Ivorians of Northern and foreign origins (the so-called dioula)
and Gbagbo with the autochthonous groups of Central-Western and
South-Eastern Côte d’Ivoire, historically hostile to the regime of Félix
Houphouët-Boigny. Since , both the power-holders and the
opposition have demonstrated their unwillingness to play the game of
democracy in a fair manner: the ﬁrst through the manipulation of the
democratic rules (Bouquet ) and the second through the use of
violence in rejecting the legitimacy of the incumbent (Vidal ).
While all this is well established, less remarked is the fact that the
manipulation of democracy in Côte d’Ivoire has taken place to a large
extent on the legal and constitutional terrain, through the manipula-
tions of the key rules of eligibility and voting rights (Bouquet ;
Bovcon ). Differently from Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié, Gueï and
Gbagbo were forced to give a cloak of democratic legitimacy to their rule
and saw in the appeal to the law a possible way out. The resort to the
manipulation of the law and especially of the Constitution – the supreme
law – allowed those who controlled the state to claim allegiance to the
formal rules of democracy, while they were violating its substance.
Bédié was the ﬁrst to sponsor an amendment of the electoral code
in order to prevent his rival Alassane Ouattara from running in the
elections, introducing the obligation to be born ‘from an Ivorian mother
and father’ for the presidential candidates. The usage of the law to
distort the democratic game reached its peak in  under the military
transition guided by Gueï, when a new Constitution was submitted to
referendum (Bouquet ). Its article  dealt with eligibility to the
presidency, and would create a long-time debate in Ivorian politics. Often
accused to be ‘ivoiritaire’ (‘Ivoritarian’), the article was formulated in
terms so vague and broad that it could be invoked to justify the exclusion
of almost any candidate. As a matter of fact, it served to prevent twelve
candidates out of seventeen from taking part in the  elections,
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including those issued from two of the three Ivorian major political
parties, the former single party Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire
(PDCI) and the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) headed by
Ouattara. Although Gbagbo eventually won, the exclusion of several
major candidates and the turmoil that accompanied his election were
going to weigh heavily on his legitimacy as new Ivorian president.
While these debates over the eligibility to the presidency went on,
another debate was opened by the FPI about the necessity of ‘cleaning’
the electoral lists from the alleged presence of foreigners and provided
the rationale for the launch of a controversial process of identiﬁcation
of the population after Gbagbo’s election (Banégas a; Marshall-
Fratani ). In this context, the FPI relied on the argument of legal-
bureaucratic rationalisation to justify its stance. FPI militants claimed to
be advocating the respect of the law in a domain – that of immigration –
where since Houphouët-Boigny illegality and informalisation had
allegedly prevailed. They explicitly denied that immigration could be
seen as a political, rather than legal-administrative, question (Campbell
: ). Richard Banégas argues that FPI ideologues propounded a
vision of a national revolution that involved building a new state
modelled on the Weberian ideal (Banégas a). However the FPI’s
modernism also covered ‘an exclusivist ideology of citizenship, founded
on the principles of autochthony and adherence to a micro-territory’
(Banégas a: ). By redeﬁning the access to citizenship and thus
to the further beneﬁts of legal power, the FPI could appropriate the
legal command emanating from the state. In terms of electoral rules,
what was at stake this time was the possible exclusion of electors
suspected of being foreigners, rather than candidates, from the electoral
consultations (Bouquet ). In the end, rather than encouraging the
regeneration of the Ivorian state, the FPI’s policies reinforced the
cleavages that eventually led to the  civil war and to nine years of
de facto territorial division between the North and the South.
The outbreak of the FN insurgency marked the beginning of a new
phase in the history of Ivorian post-Houphouët-Boigny turmoil. The
rebellion began on the night of  September  as a group of
military ofﬁcers of Northern ethnicity tried to overthrow the regime of
Laurent Gbagbo. This group had already played a role in a coup that
had brought General Gueï to power, but had later broken with him.
Most of its members lived in exile in Burkina Faso before participating in
the insurgency. Although the coup was ultimately unsuccessful, it was
well prepared, having beneﬁted from complicities in Côte d’Ivoire’s
neighbouring countries, while the alleged connection of the FN with the
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Ivorian opposition remains a controversial matter. With the occupation
by the putschists of the Centre-Northern half of the country, including
Bouaké, the second biggest city of the country, and Korhogo, the main
urban centre of the North, the coup effectively became a full-scale
insurgency. The rebels were eventually stopped in their offensive
towards the South by the interposition of the French military. The
conﬂict was frozen and the country cut in half.
Under the leadership of young former student leader Guillaume
Soro, who would prove a skilled politician, the rebels organised
politically. In their discourse, they claimed to be ﬁghting against ivoirité
and the Gbagbo regime’s xenophobia (Gadou ; Fofana ). In
their own defence, the members of the Gbagbo regime put forward an
opposite interpretation of the crisis and of the rebellion. While the FN
insisted that their rebellion should be seen as the outcome of long-term
grievances, Gbagbo’s supporters were rather pointing to the proximate
causes of the insurgency. They painted the rebellion as a ‘foreign
terrorist attack’, sponsored by Alassane Ouattara and by ‘rogue states’ of
the sub-region such as Burkina Faso. The political and identity-based
grievances of the FN were disqualiﬁed as pretexts for covering the
insurgents’ quest for power and wealth. However, the rebellion started
soon to be portrayed also as illegal in its essence, as an attack against the
‘juridically sovereign’ state of Côte d’Ivoire.
During the ﬁrst months of the crisis, the nationalist virulence of
the Ivorian regime seemed moderated by the acknowledgement that
the international community, particularly France and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), were to some extent
responsive to its arguments and condemned the use of force on the part
of the rebels (ECOWAS ; French Foreign Affairs Ministry
.., ..). Gradually, however, the decision of ECOWAS
and France to push for a negotiated solution to the crisis, which implied
the at-least partial recognition of the grievances of the rebels, prevailed.
It was this new approach that informed the Linas-Marcoussis peace talks,
held in the outskirts of Paris in January  and sponsored and
mediated by France (Du Bois de Gaudusson ; Smith ; Mehler
).
As the Gbagbo regime felt increasingly abandoned and betrayed,
particularly by the former colonial master, it increasingly deployed law
and legalism against both internal enemies and the international
community. Gbagbo’s insistence on the law and the Constitution was
already evident at the opening of the Linas-Marcoussis talks, in an
interview that he gave to Le Monde reporter Stephen Smith. He argued
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that he would have ‘trampled over the Constitution’ had he accepted the
nomination of a transitional government and insisted that the peace
talks should not aim at organising a transition but at restoring the ‘legal
order’ (Le Monde ..). After the end of the negotiations, the
regime clung to legality and to the Constitution for justifying its refusal
of the agreement – notably as far as it concerned the establishment of a
transitional government and the power-sharing arrangement with the
rebels – and of the principle itself of a negotiated solution of the crisis.
In this process, state sovereignty was identiﬁed with the Constitution and
the legal framework of Côte d’Ivoire. The Constitution was sacralised,
transformed into a symbol of independence of the country and opposed
to international norms and decisions.
T H E R O L E O F L E G A L I S M I N I V O R I A N P O L I T I C S S I N C E L I N A S
M A R C O U S S I S T O T H E P O S T - E L E C T I O N C R I S I S
I now turn to an analysis of the use and evolution of legalist discourse by
the Gbagbo regime during the Ivorian peace process, from the Linas-
Marcoussis accords to the post-election crisis. I focus this analysis on
three key episodes: the debate over the legal binding force of the Linas-
Marcoussis agreement, the discussion over the amendment of article 
of the Ivorian Constitution and again, brieﬂy, the post-election crisis.
The debate over the legal binding force of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement
An example of particularly signiﬁcant juridical debate in this respect is
the polemic over the legal binding force of the Linas-Marcoussis
agreement. As Jean Du Bois de Gaudusson () remarks, criticism
by the Gbagbo regime in the aftermath of the conclusion of the
agreement was not really focused over the content of the political
programme deﬁned by Linas-Marcoussis. Instead, it concentrated ‘over
the nature of the agreement, the constitutionality of its provisions, the
modalities of its application and, in short, over its binding force over the
parties’ (Du Bois de Gaudusson : ).
This controversy was opened on state television, the Radio
Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI), by a senior politician who was going to
play a key role in the – post-election crisis: Paul Yao N’dre,
Minister of Interior of the outgoing Ivorian government and a well-
known jurist. In his analysis of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement ‘from a
juridical and political angle’, Yao N’dre stated that the Ivorian regime
was not obliged to implement the agreement, as the latter was legally
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non-valid (Notre Voie ..). He justiﬁed this conclusion by several
arguments. First, the negotiations had been conducted by actors who
could not legally engage the will of the Ivorian state. Second, he stated
that the agreement was legally subordinated to the Ivorian Constitution,
but that at the same time it clashed with it on too many points, such as
the status of the transitional prime minister, the partial disarmament of
the national armed forces and the imperative mandate given to the
members of parliament. He concluded that Linas-Marcoussis was ‘a null
and void agreement’.
It is important to stress that the arguments of Yao N’dre were not
just his own personal opinions, but were re-proposed by many other
supporters of the regime (Du Bois de Gaudusson ; Koulibaly ;
Gomé Gnohité ; Ba & Wade ). In a more ambiguous form,
they were adopted by Gbagbo himself in his public speech of  February
, the ﬁrst after the conclusion of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement.
Gbagbo claimed not to reject the ‘spirit’ of the Linas-Marcoussis
agreement but expressed his determination to make the Constitution
prevail. He endorsed most of Yao N’dre’s views, including that the
agreement had been ‘a discussion between private entities’ and that ‘the
most striking shortcomings [of Linas-Marcoussis] . . . are the parts of this
text where it is in contradiction with the Constitution of Côte d’Ivoire’.
He stated his intention ‘to keep all the prerogatives that the Constitution
grants me’ and to apply the Constitution ‘every time that there will be a
contradiction between the text of Marcoussis and the Constitution’
(Fraternité Matin ..).
The legalist and legitimist disqualiﬁcation of Linas-Marcoussis was
politically useful to the Ivorian regime for at least three reasons. First, it
was a formal argument. It did not imply that the grievances of the FN
were not grounded, but pushed them into the background with respect
to the illegal and illegitimate conduct of the rebels. The legal argument
was thus presented as a condemnation of the use of force and violence
for political ends. It thus allowed the Ivorian regime to escape from an
open and frank debate over a series of problematic issues such as ivoirité
or the land tenure regime that were deeply affecting Ivorian society.
Second, considering the bias of the Ivorian Constitution in favour of the
powers of the president, the regime could reject as anti-Constitutional
any transitional solution that would have affected the powers and
prerogatives of the president. Third, the legalist argument was a way of
rejecting the decisions taken at an international level by discussing
their place in the legal order, rather than their substance. In this sense,
legalist arguments were in part crafted for the international community.
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The fact that they were employed by top Ivorian state ofﬁcials on the
national media and that the exaltation of the Constitution featured
prominently in the young patriots’ discourses at popular ‘agoràs’ and
‘parlements’ (Banégas b) suggest however that they were equally
important in addressing the Ivorian internal public.
The polemics over the reform of the article  of the Ivorian Constitution
Another key episode for understanding the importance of the juridical
and formalist argument as a political instrument for the Gbagbo regime
was the debate around the reform, required by the Linas-Marcoussis
agreement, of article  of the Ivorian Constitution. Once more,
the content of the article and of the reformulation proposed by the
Linas-Marcoussis agreement were not the main focus. Rather, the FPI
concentrated on the constitutional requirement that the Constitution
could be amended only by referendum.
In order to ﬁnd a solution to the issue of the article , transitional
prime minister Seydou Diarra and the international sponsors of the
peace agreement decided they too would play the legal game and seek a
shortcut to reconcile the Constitution with Linas-Marcoussis. The
mechanism consisted in asking the president to use the exceptional
emergency powers attributed to him by article  of the Constitution
for promulgating the reforms, after their approval by the National
Assembly, without the need to pass through a referendum. In July 
the so-called Accra III agreement, issued from new negotiations
organised by UN Secretary General Koﬁ Annan and Ghanaian president
John Kufuor, was supposed to incorporate this proposal. However, due
to the opposition of the FPI, the ﬁnal version concerning the use of
extraordinary powers did not include the reform of the article .
Pascal Afﬁ N’guessan, former prime minister and president of the FPI,
explained the FPI position in these words:
It is not for solving a little referendum issue that he [the president] is going
to make use of the exceptional powers. An issue that, furthermore, does not
fall within his authority. Because the revision of the eligibility condition is a
matter of national sovereignty and our Constitution is clear on this point.
The president of the Republic can employ his exceptional powers, but these
powers do not give him the possibility to modify article  of the Ivorian
Constitution. An abundant case law, as the jurists says, exists on the matter.
(Notre Voie ..)
In November , the launch by the Gbagbo regime of Opération
Dignité – a campaign of air strikes on the rebel-controlled North – and
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the turmoil that followed, including clashes between the French
army and the Ivorian young patriots, interrupted for some time the
political dialogue. After the return to normalcy, the discussion over
the reform of article  resumed under the mediation of Thabo
Mbeki. Because of his reputation as an anti-colonialist hero, the
president of South Africa enjoyed the conﬁdence and sympathy of the
presidential side, which enabled him to obtain some important
concessions. In December , the FPI parliamentary group approved
the amendment of the article, but continued to insist that a referendum
was needed to ﬁnalise it.
Why did the pro-Gbagbo camp insist so much on the need to
amend the Constitution by referendum? Several reasons were behind
the pro-Gbagbo request. First, given the difﬁculty of organising a
referendum in a country cut in half, with a contested electoral list, the
insistence on a referendum allowed for time and postponed the
resolution of the crisis, and hence the date of the presidential elections.
Second, the FPI wanted to re-launch its long-standing demand to make
the disarmament of the FN the precondition for constitutional reform,
and thus it asked for at least a partial demilitarisation of the North as a
condition for holding the referendum. However, as suggested by Afﬁ
N’guessan’s argument that the reform of the Constitution was not within
the authority of the president, the insistence over the amendment rules
was also a way for Gbagbo to escape responsibility by appealing to ‘the
law’. This attitude may also be seen, for instance, in Gbagbo’s replies to
an interview from the Senegalese newspaper Le Soleil at the end of
November . To the interviewer, who was asking him if at the time
of his election he had ‘intended to have the Constitution, notably its
article , amended at a later stage’, Gbagbo just replied: ‘This is not my
own problem. One should look at the law’ (reprinted in Notre Voie
..).
Within the presidential circle, the only discordant voice was the
President of the Economic and Social Council, Laurent Dona Fologo,
a former senior ﬁgure of the PDCI who now supported Gbagbo. On
several occasions, Fologo stated that the FPI should not reject a priori
‘what I have called the positive rape of the Constitution [viol positif de la
constitution]’ (Notre Voie ..). However, the phrase ‘positive rape’
actually reinforced the impression that the Constitution was sacred and
untouchable and any attempt to modify it amounted to a crime. At any
rate, Fologo was rapidly disavowed by other more radical pro-Gbagbo
leaders, such as FPI youth wing leader Konaté Navigué (Notre Voie
..).
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The post-electoral crisis of –
The exaltation of the law and the discourse of legalism dominated the
pro-Gbagbo rhetoric during the – post-electoral crisis. Formal
and procedural arguments were invoked and the place of the
Constitutional Council in the Ivorian legal framework was particularly
stressed. Shortly after the ceremony of investiture, Gbagbo was very
explicit in representing the crisis as a clash between the ‘legalists’ and
‘those who have taken the road of illegality’.
I remind you that the IEC is an administrative authority, while the
Constitutional Council is the highest jurisdiction of Côte d’Ivoire. The two
institutions are not comparable and it is illegitimate to compare them.
Their decisions are of a different nature. They have neither the same
foundation, nor the same impact . . . I have waited for the voice of law to be
expressed . . . They want to scare us, but they cannot expect that the legalists
will surrender to those who have taken the road of illegality. Those who
respect the Constitution and would give their life to defend it will not
surrender to those who want to demolish the foundations of the Republic
and of democracy. (Gbagbo )
During the post-electoral crisis, the sovereignty of the country and
the will of the ‘people’ were increasingly identiﬁed by Gbagbo with the
principle of legality. He claimed during his oath of ofﬁce that
the sovereignty of Côte d’Ivoire was ‘what I am in charge of defending’
and that ‘the presidential seat has an owner, it is the people. It is to the
people and to the people only that one shall speak’ (Fraternité Matin
..). Gbagbo’s point was that the laws and institutions of the
country were the true expression of the ‘will of the people’ when in
reality they had been, to a good extent, engineered from above: the
Constitutional Council judges had been appointed by the president, not
elected. His populist discourse masked the fact that the Constitutional
Council was in fact denying many citizens the right to express themselves
by invalidating their vote.
The superiority of the Constitutional Council was also employed by
Gbagbo’s supporters to neutralise the certiﬁcation of the votes by UN
Special Representative of the Secretary General Choi and denounce it
as illegitimate. Fraternité Matin, for instance, published an analysis by
well-known jurist Ouaraga Obou who, while not a pro-Gbagbo hardliner,
expressed arguments that were very popular among Gbagbo’s suppor-
ters. He notably introduced a subtle distinction between ‘certiﬁcation’
and ‘validation’ and argued that the UN certiﬁcation mandate did
not change the fact that ‘the latter authority is a prerogative of the
Constitutional Council only’ (Fraternité Matin ..).
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The legal defence of Gbagbo’s stance in the post-election crisis was
however particularly weak. Notably, by invalidating the elections in a
speciﬁc area of the country and then proceeding to reverse the results,
the Constitutional Council itself had violated the electoral code
(Republic of Côte d’Ivoire ) and thus the law it claimed to
defend. Moreover, the Constitutional Council’s statement was even
poorly written from a legal point of view, as it called ‘departments’ what
were in fact election coordination centres. The weakness of the legal
arguments was not an insigniﬁcant factor in the almost unanimous
opposition that Gbagbo met at the international level, and in his
eventual fall. For the rest, the – attitude of the Gbagbo regime
during the post-electoral crisis was in full continuity with its past strategy
(ICG : ). By the same tactic that had allowed him in the past to
challenge peace agreements and international decisions, Gbagbo tried
now to engineer a ‘legal’ victory after losing at the ballot boxes.
C O N C L U S I O N
During the Ivorian crisis, legal arguments were central in the
political discourse of Laurent Gbagbo and his allies and constituted an
important component of the nationalism of the Gbagbo regime and of
its conception of the defence of the Constitution and of the national
sovereignty.
The signiﬁcance of this aspect of Ivorian nationalism has been
underestimated or passed unnoticed, perhaps because obscured by the
anti-colonialist rhetoric of the regime and because the ideologically
conservative tone of the formalist and procedural appeal to the law
contrasted with the image of a ‘revolutionary’ Laurent Gbagbo. The
legal argument was nevertheless central in the struggle of the Gbagbo
regime to stay in power. The regime established an equation between
the law, national sovereignty and democracy. Sovereignty was identiﬁed
with the Constitution and the internal legal framework of Côte d’Ivoire,
which were sacralised as the true representation of the will of the
‘people’. Respect for the Constitution and the law more generally was
used to justify the refusal to implement internationally sponsored peace
agreements and to comply with international norms and decisions.
The importance of the law in the Ivorian political struggle provides
evidence in favour of Englebert’s argument that the juridical sovereignty
conferred at the international level translates internally into the
centrality of the legal command emanating from the state. This power
becomes a key instrument of domination in politics and in society and
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also contributes to explain the resilience of the state in times of
crisis – because legal command belongs to the state only. Informal
relations of clientelism and patronage matter in Africa, but what
provides access to rents are the formal institutions of the state, endowed
by legal command. Legalist nationalism should also be seen in the
context of an ‘invented’ post-colonial state, lacking cultural bonds or a
history of national liberation able to provide a ‘foundation myth’ for a
nationalist narrative.
The problem of (ﬂawed) transition to democracy shall also be
taken into account. In the last two decades, African states have come
under increasing pressure to democratise. This has further strained
the claims to legitimacy of their heads of state, in a context where neo-
patrimonialism still constitutes the predominant form of governance in
many of these states. Some African rulers have responded by manipulat-
ing the law in a way to convey the impression that the formal rules of
democracy are followed, while the substance is violated (Van de Walle
). For example, Daniel Posner and Daniel Young singled out
nine African countries (Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia, Chad, Gabon,
Guinea, Namibia, Togo, Uganda) for the period – where the
president attempted to amend the Constitution in order to serve a
third term, although only in six of them was the attempt successful
(Posner & Young ).
An optimistic interpretation suggests that the degenerations of
legalism may be part of a twofold process of state building and
democratization, where informal practices are gradually replaced by
institutionalised rules. The institutionalisation of political power may
become a positive force, as the examples of those African countries
where Constitutional Courts have managed to emancipate themselves
from the executive power and take over a role of defenders of
democracy suggest (Bovcon ). This view is expressed by Posner
and Young, for whom the fact that African leaders who have managed to
circumvent restrictions ‘have done so through formal institutional
channels rather than extraconstitutional means’ (Posner & Young :
) is in itself a positive development.
This view echoes that of the international practitioners of ‘good
governance’ who have generally tended to highlight the positive and
emancipatory potential of the law, as guarantee of democracy and of
individual rights. This trend can be explained on the one hand by the
role that the Constitutions and the rule of law have had in the struggle
for democracy in European and Western history. On the other hand, it
stems from the ‘highly modernist’ (Scott ) spirit that pervades
U L T R A N A T I O N A L I S M , D E M O C R A C Y A N D T H E L A W
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 16 Sep 2014 IP address: 213.39.242.14
international institutions and development agencies, their ambition to
create functional states in the image of the Western ones and to ‘order’
the world, thus making it readable.
The Ivorian case suggests that the issue is more complex. Law and
disorder may in fact not be opposite but constitutive of each other
(Comaroff & Comaroff ) and there may be no contradiction
between a political agenda that purportedly supports the principle
of legality and detrimental partisan policies. The law and even the
Constitution, instead of setting limits on power-holders, can easily
become instruments in the internal and international political struggle.
It is possible that, to some extent, the Ivorian obsession with the law is
part of a political culture where the principle of justice, although
frequently invoked in a partisan manner, is valued and sets limits to
political violence and arbitrariness (McGovern ). It is also possible
that the gradual institutionalisation of rules, even when these rules
are illiberal, may lay a favourable breeding ground to a future
democratic transformation, as in the case of post-apartheid South
Africa (Meierhenrich ). However, the Ivorian case also suggests
that the institutionalisation of political power can encourage political
leaders to pursue policies that are more dangerous than the ones that
they would have pursued if they were unconstrained. For instance, the
need to ﬁnd legally plausible arguments in order to exclude Ouattara
from standing for the presidency led in Côte d’Ivoire to the opening of
the debate on the identity of ‘foreigners’, which polarised Ivorian
society, with detrimental consequences. The Ivorian case also suggests
that the idea of bureaucratic rationalisation that underlines many
externally sponsored state building efforts may dangerously converge
with the instrumental use of law and formal institutions by local political
actors. In the end, such effort to redeﬁne the state may lead to state
decay, rather than state building. What role the law will play in the future
of Côte d’Ivoire remains to be seen. There are signs, however, that the
current Alassane Ouattara administration is not breaking decisively with
the past (Bovcon ) and that the involvement of the International
Criminal Court in Côte d’Ivoire is changing little in a context where the
law continues to be seen as a tool in the hands of the power holders,
rather than as a weapon of the weak.
N O T E S
. For an analysis of the electoral results and of the subsequent dispute, see Bassett () and
European Union (). On the role of the UN during the Ivorian crisis, see also Piccolino ().
. This and all other translations from the French are by the author.
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. For recent discussions of neo-patrimonialism, see Erdmann & Engel () and Bach &
Gazibo ().
. See the UN ofﬁcial website: <http://www.un.org/en/ruleoﬂaw/index.shtml>, accessed
...
. Although dioula is the name of a speciﬁc ethnic group, it is also the etiquette given in Côte
d’Ivoire to Northern Ivorians and Ivorians of foreign descent. For a discussion of the construction of
the category of dioula see Cutolo ().
. The text of article  is the following: ‘The candidate to the presidential election shall not be
younger than forty years nor older than sixty-ﬁve years. He shall be Ivorian by birth, born by a father
and mother born Ivorians. He shall never have renounced the Ivorian nationality. He shall never
have claimed another nationality. He shall have had his residence in Côte d’Ivoire for ﬁve years
without interruptions at the moment of the presidential elections and have totalized ten years of
effective presence in the country. . . The candidate to the Presidency of the Republic shall be in a full
state of mental and physical well-being, which must be duly certiﬁed by a board of three medical
doctors, nominated by the Constitutional Council out of a list compiled by the Professional
Association of the Medical Doctors. These three physicians must take an oath by the Constitutional
Council. The candidate must be of a good character and of a great integrity. He shall disclose his
patrimony and justify its origins’ (Republic of Côte d’Ivoire : art. ).
. Gbagbo’s FPI was the only one of the three top Ivorian parties that could secure the
participation of its candidate. Notably, three candidates tried to run under the banner of the PDCI
and all were declared ineligible. Bédié was one of the three but due to his unpopularity the PDCI had
presented another ofﬁcial candidate, former Minister of Interior Emile Constant Bombet (Bouquet
).
. Although there was a substantial coincidence between the agenda of the insurgents and that of
the RDR, with Ouattara repeatedly pointed out by the Gbagbo regime as the ‘father of the rebellion’,
allegations of complicity have never been proven and the origins of the FN still remain to some
degree unclear. For a discussion, see International Crisis Group ().
. See for instance ‘Les ambassadeurs expriment le soutien de leur gouvernements à la Côte
d’Ivoire’ (Notre Voie, ..) and ‘Pr. Mamadou Koulibaly: “Le Parlement exhorte le
gouvernement à saisir le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies” ’ (Notre Voie, ..).
. Italic in the original text.
. In fact, Ivorian dean Constitutionalist Ouraga Obou, who served as an advisor for Prime
Minister of the government of national unity Seydou Diarra in  and was regularly in touch with
French mediator Pierre Mazeaud during the Linas Marcoussis negotiations notices that the so-called
international community failed to understand the importance of the law and the Constitution during
the crisis (Ouraga Obou, personal communication). This facilitated Gbagbo’s and his supporters’
efforts to claim in front of the Ivorian public that the international agreements were unconstitutional
and illegitimate.
. The proposed new provision stated the following: ‘the candidate must be in possession of his
civil and political rights and be at least thirty-ﬁve years of age. He must have only Ivorian citizenship
and must have a father or a mother born Ivorian’ (Republic of Côte d’Ivoire : ).
. ‘When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its
territory or the execution of its international engagements are threatened in a serious and immediate
manner and the regular functioning of the public and constitutional powers is interrupted,
the President of the Republic takes the exceptional measures that the situation requires after
a compulsory consultation with the President of the National assembly and the President of
the Constitutional council. He informs the nation with a message’ (Republic of Côte d’Ivoire :
art. ).
. ‘In view of the persistent grave threat to the territorial integrity of Côte d’Ivoire caused by
the continuing crisis, the President of the Republic shall use the powers conferred upon him by the
Constitution to implement by the end of September  the provisions of section III on eligibility of
the Programme of the Government of National Reconciliation annexed to the Linas-Marcoussis
Agreement’ (Republic of Côte d’Ivoire : ).
. For the full declaration see ‘Déclaration du groupe parlementaire FPI’ (Notre Voie
..).
. For an in-depth discussion, see European Union (), which also includes as an appendix
the full text of the Decision of the Constitutional Council and a legal analysis of it.
. The confusion derived from the fact that the electoral administration mirrors the territorial
administration as it stood before the creation of new departments in .
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